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1. Introduction 
Discrete choice models are suitable for representing a consumer‟s micro behavior.  For example, 
consider a problem in which a consumer chooses between one unit of brands A and B of a particular 
good.  Comparing the utility levels obtained from brands A and B, the consumer chooses the brand 
that yields higher utility.  This setup is consistent with utility maximization by the consumer.  
However, this problem represents only part of the consumer‟s behavior.  This is because the reason 
for the consumer choosing a unit of the good is not explained.  The third option of „not buying‟, 
which involves not purchasing either brand, does not completely solve the problem because, in this 
case, one needs to make the a priori assumption that the consumer‟s total demand is restricted to at 
most one unit.  Thus, typical discrete choice models explain only part of consumer behavior because 
their use involves making an a priori assumption about the controlled total, which is exogenous.  
This has been repeatedly argued by McFadden (1999, p. 273), Nevo (2000, footnote 14), and Nevo 
(2001, footnote 13), but no clear theoretical foundation for the argument has been developed.
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The purpose of this paper is to formulate a model in which discrete choice models are 
incorporated consistently into the full utility maximization framework and to establish a theoretical 
foundation for the discrete choice model that assumes no a priori controlled total.  In our framework, 
the results from discrete choice models are explained consistently whether a controlled total exists or 
not: the case in which there is a controlled total is a special case.  The implications of discrete choice 
                                                 
2
 Nevo (2001, footnote 13) states: “A comment is in place about the realism of the assumption that consumers 
choose no more than one brand.  Many households buy more than one brand of cereal in each super market trip but 
most people consume only one brand of cereal at a time, which is the relevant fact for this modeling assumption.  
Nevertheless, if one is still unwilling to accept that this is a negligible phenomenon, then this model can be viewed 
as an approximation to the true choice model.”  Nevo (2000, footnote 14) makes the same point.  McFadden (1999, 
p. 273) raises the possibility that an alternative can be interpreted “as a „portfolio‟ of decisions made in sequence, 
or as one of the multiple decisions.” 
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models are also clarified, because the form of the utility function of the representative consumer, the 
own-price and cross-price elasticities, and the method of measuring welfare are derived in such a 
way that our results are directly comparable with standard microeconomic utility maximization. 
We focus on the generalized extreme value (GEV) model, and its mixed form, because it 
generates analytically closed-form demand functions.  Given that Dagsvik (1995) and McFadden and 
Train (2000) show that the GEV model and the mixed logit model can approximate any random 
utility model, our analysis is quite general.  For illustrative purposes, we focus on the logit and mixed 
logit models as special cases before fully analyzing the GEV and mixed GEV models.  As we show 
subsequently, analyzing the GEV and mixed GEV models is similar to analyzing the logit and mixed 
logit models. 
Our main results are as follows.  First, if a representative consumer‟s choice is represented by 
the logit model, his or her demand function for a good has the form of the market demand function 
for a group of goods multiplied by the choice probability of the good.  (The market demand function 
for a group of goods is the sum of the market demands across all goods.)  This form of the demand 
function is obtained when the indirect utility function of the representative consumer follows 
Gorman‟s (1961) framework and incorporates its restriction, and when the log-sum term is 
incorporated as the price index.  Making the market demand for a group endogenous affects the own-
price and cross-price elasticities of the market demand for a good.  The price elasticity of the market 
demand for a group of goods is added to the usual own-price and cross-price elasticities in „classical‟ 
logit models.  Throughout the paper, we use the word „classical‟ to represent a situation in which a 
consumer is assumed to make a single selection among a set of mutually exclusive alternatives.  The 
change in welfare can be measured by using any of the four levels of demand: a consumer‟s demand 
for a good, the market demand for a good, a consumer‟s demand for a group of goods, or the market 
demand for a group of goods.  If we measure the change in welfare by using a consumer‟s demand 
for a good or the market demand for a good, the corresponding price is the price of the good.  If we 
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measure the welfare change by using a consumer‟s demand for a group of goods or the market 
demand for a group of goods, the corresponding price is the log-sum term.  The change in welfare in 
the classical logit model is typically calculated as the difference in the log-sum term multiplied by 
the total demand; this method is a special case of our analysis. 
Second, our analysis can easily be extended to cases in which goods are classified into multiple 
groups.  In this case, we can construct a model in which the choice within each group, such as 
between food and clothes, is represented by the logit model but the choice among groups is subject to 
any relationship.  Not restricting relationships between groups is an advantage of our formulation.  
For example, the nested-logit model incorporates the grouping of goods, but the relationship between 
groups is limited to the logit. 
Third, analyzing the mixed logit model requires modification.  In the mixed logit model, each 
consumer has his or her own parameters.  This implies that the log-sum term, which represents his or 
her price index, differs among consumers.  Hence, the indirect utility function of the representative 
consumer must be quasi-linear because all consumers must have the same income coefficient for 
their Gorman-form indirect utility function.  Similar results are obtained with regard to elasticities: 
the price elasticity of the market demand for a group is added to the usual own-price and cross-price 
elasticities.  The change in welfare can be measured by using a consumer‟s demand for a good or a 
consumer‟s demand for a group.  A difference from the logit model is that one cannot calculate the 
change in welfare by using the market demand for a good or the market demand for a group.  The 
reason for this is that because each consumer‟s demand depends on his or her own parameters, the 
market demand cannot be derived without integrating out these terms.  As in the case of the logit 
model, our analysis can easily be extended to the case in which goods are classified into multiple 
groups and to the case of the mixed GEV model. 
Next, we briefly relate our analysis to the existing literature.  The first line of research related to 
our paper is analysis of the relationship between discrete choice models and representative consumer 
 5 
models.  Anderson et al. (1988, 1992, Ch. 3) and Verboven (1996) derive direct utility functions for 
the representative consumer that are consistent with the logit and nested logit models.  Not only does 
our analysis correspond to the more general GEV model, which includes their models as special 
cases, but also we derive a utility maximization problem that is consistent with the mixed-GEV 
model.  Moreover, we formulate a utility maximization problem that corresponds to the GEV and 
mixed-GEV models in a more realistic and more general framework: goods are classified into 
multiple groups, and a consumer can choose any number of goods from any groups. 
The second line of research is the analysis of welfare measurement for discrete choice models.  
First, welfare measurement for discrete choice models is theoretically analyzed by, among others, 
Small and Rosen (1981) in a general form, but the market demand for a group is assumed 
exogenous.
3
  Our analysis is an extension of theirs because we make the market demand for a group 
endogenous and develop a method of measuring welfare that is applicable to the case of endogenous 
demand.  Second, Herriges and Kling (1999), McFadden (1999), De Palma and Kilani (2003), and 
Dagsvik and Karlstrom (2005) analyze welfare measurement for discrete choice models in which an 
indirect utility function is nonlinear in income.
4
  In these analyses, the focus is on a one-consumer 
economy, in which the individual consumer‟s indirect utility function coincides with the 
representative consumer‟s indirect utility function, and the change in welfare is derived.  In a many-
consumer economy, with heterogeneous consumers, these analyses are inapplicable.  This is because 
the aggregated compensating variation may not be consistent with the compensation test and thus 
may be of limited use.  This is known as the Boadway paradox.
5
  Our analysis is complementary to 
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 See Pakes et al. (1993), Berry et al. (1999), and Petrin (2002) for empirical research in which it is assumed that 
the utility obtained from a good is nonlinear with respect to income. 
5
 See Boadway (1974). 
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existing analyses in that we can aggregate each consumer‟s welfare change consistently but the form 
of the indirect utility functions is limited to the Gorman form.
6
 
The third line of research is recent empirical applications of discrete choice models, which range 
from models for durable goods such as housing (Earnhart 2002) and automobiles (Berry et al. 1995, 
Goldberg 1995, and Petrin 2002), to daily consumables such as ready-to-eat cereal (Nevo 2002) and 
tuna (Nevo and Hatzitaskos 2005).  The point is whether it is appropriate to assume that consumers 
choose no more than one unit of a good.  The validity of this assumption depends on the 
characteristics of the good.  Arguably, the assumption is reasonable for housing and automobiles but 
not for ready-to-eat cereal and tuna because different consumers demand different amounts.  We 
establish a theoretical basis for applying discrete choice models to cases in which consumers choose 
multiple units and in which different consumers demand different amounts.
7
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we focus on the logit model.  In 
Section 3, the analysis is extended to the GEV model.  In Section 4, we examine the mixed logit 
model.  In Section 5, we examine the mixed GEV model.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The Logit Model 
We begin with the logit model.  The GEV model, which includes the logit model as a special 
case, is discussed in the next section. 
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 Blackorby and Donaldson (1990) show that the Boadway paradox is resolved by assuming that the representative 
consumer has an indirect utility function of the Gorman form. 
7
 Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Hanemann (1984) assume that a consumer first chooses a brand and then 
decides how many units of that brand to buy.  Our analysis differs because a consumer is free to choose multiple 
brands as well as multiple units.  Hendel (1999) focuses on the situation in which a firm buys multiple computers of 
multiple brands depending on the tasks that need performing.  Although his analysis takes into account that 
multiple brands are chosen, it is based on profit maximization by a firm. 
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Consider an N-consumer economy with 1M   goods.  The goods are numbered consecutively 
from 0  to M .  The price of good 0 , whose market demand is 0X , is normalized at unity.  The 
market demand and price of good j  are jX  and jp  ( 1,...,j M ), respectively.  The income of 
consumer i  is iy  ( 1,...,i N ). 
Utility maximization by consumer i  yields the indirect utility function, 1( ,..., , )
i i
Mv p p y .  In this 
paper, we assume that each consumer‟s preference can be aggregated to a representative consumer‟s 
preference.  Without this assumption, there is no clear relationship between the sum of consumers‟ 
compensating variations and the compensation principle, as Blackorby and Donaldson (1990) show. 
Gorman (1961) shows that in order to define the preferences of a representative consumer by 
aggregating individual consumer preferences, consumer i ‟s indirect utility function must have the 
so-called Gorman form: 
(1) 1 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ,..., ) ( ,..., )
i i i i
M M Mv p p y A p p B p p y  . 
Henceforth, we refer to this requirement as the Gorman restriction.  Summing indirect utility 
functions across consumers yields the representative consumer‟s indirect utility function, as follows: 
(2) 1 1 1
1 1
( ,..., , ) ( ,..., ) ( ,..., )
N N
i i i
M M M
i i
V v p p y A p p B p p Y
 
    , 
where 
1
N
i
i
Y y

  is aggregate income.  Applying Roy‟s Identity to (1) and (2) yields consumer i ‟s 
demand for good j , 1( ,..., , )
i i
j Mx p p y , and the market demand for good j , 1( ,..., , )j MX p p Y , as 
follows: 
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(3) 1
( )
( ,..., , )
i i
j ji i
j M i
i
v A B
p p
x p p y
v B
y
  
 
 
 


, 
(4) 
1
1 1
1
( )
( ,..., , ) ( ,..., , )
iN
N
ij j i i
j M j M
i
V A B
p p
X p p Y x p p y
V B
Y


  
 
 
  



 . 
2.1 A utility maximization problem that yields logit-type demand functions 
For now, suppose that all goods belong to the same group.  The case of different groups is 
addressed in Section 2.4.  Suppose that the market demand function for good j  is consistent with the 
logit model: 
(5) 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ,..., , )j M M jX p p Y C p p Y s , 
where 1( ,..., , )MC p p Y  is the market demand for a „group‟, which is the sum of demands for goods 1 
to M , and js  is the choice probability from the logit model: 
(6) 
1
exp( ( , ))
exp( ( , ))
j j
j M
k k
k
u p Y
s
u p Y



. 
We obtain the following proposition about the form of the indirect utility function of the 
representative consumer. 
Proposition 1 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the market demand function for good j  to have the 
form of (5) is that the indirect utility function of the representative consumer be: 
 9 
(7) ( ) ( )V A LS B LS Y  , 
where 
1
1
( , ,..., )
N
i
M
i
A A LS p p

  and: 
(8) 
1
1
ln exp( )
M
k k
k
LS p 
 
   . 
The market demand function for good j , (5), satisfies: 
(9) 1( ,..., , ) ( , ) 0M
A B
Y
LS LS
C p p Y C LS Y
B
  
  
     , 
(10) 
1
exp( )
exp( )
j j
j M
j
k k
k
p LS
s
p
p
 
 

 
 


. 
Proof 
See Appendix 1. 
A model in which a controlled total exists is „partial‟, because the determination of the 
controlled total is left unexplained.  Because there is no controlled total, the representative 
consumer‟s indirect utility function, (7), corresponds to complete utility maximization; the market 
demand for a group, (9), is endogenously determined by the log-sum term, (8) and by aggregate 
income.  Thus, although the utility maximization problem described in Proposition 1 yields a result 
that is consistent with the logit model, it does not suffer from the problem associated with discrete 
choice models identified by McFadden (1999, p. 273), Nevo (2000, footnote 14), and Nevo (2001, 
footnote 13); that is, the problem of having to assume an a priori controlled total.  The representative 
consumer‟s indirect utility function, (7), includes the case of the fixed controlled total as a special 
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case; for instance, V NLS Y    represents a representative consumer‟s indirect utility function that 
is consistent with the logit model in which the controlled total is N . 
The market demand for a group, (9), is a function of the log-sum term and aggregate income 
only; it depends on the prices of each good only through the log-sum term.  The log-sum term plays 
the role of the aggregate price or the price index for the market demand for the group of goods.  This 
property is of practical use for the estimation of demand structures.  Suppose that one estimates a 
logit model and that, as a next step, one estimates the market demand for a group by using the 
estimated log-sum term.  In this case, the derived market demand for a group of goods and the 
demand for each individual good are consistent with a complete utility maximization model. 
The term ( , )j ju p Y , which can be interpreted as the utility obtained from consuming a unit of 
good j , must be linear in price and independent of income; that is, j j ju p   .  If it is nonlinear 
in price, the market demand for a group differs among goods, which contradicts the fact that the 
logit-type market demand function for a good has the form of the common market demand for a 
group multiplied by the choice probability for a good.  If the utility from consuming a unit of good j  
depends on income, the log-sum term also depends on income and, consequently, the Gorman 
restriction is not satisfied; hence, aggregating consumers‟ preferences to those of the representative 
consumer is impossible. 
Note that, in the logit model, the utility from consuming a unit of good j  and, thus, the choice 
probability for good j , are the same for all consumers.  (See Appendix 1 for details.)  When the 
utility from consuming a unit of good j  and, thus, the choice probability for good j  differs among 
consumers, the corresponding model is the mixed logit model, which is analyzed in Section 4. 
Anderson et al. (1988, 1992 Ch. 3) derive the direct utility function of a representative consumer 
when the market demand for a group of goods is endogenously determined.  In our framework, the 
corresponding direct utility function is: 
 11 
(11) 
0
1 1
1
1
ln
M M
k
k k kM
k k
k
k
Xb
U X h X X
X

  

  
   
      
   
  
  
 

, 
where b  is a constant, 0h  , and 0h  .  This direct utility function corresponds to a special case 
of (7), as we show below.  Maximizing (11) with respect to the budget constraint: 
(12) 
0
1
M
k k
k
Y X p X

  , 
yields the following market demand function for good j : 
(13) 1
1
exp( )
exp( )
j j
j M
k k
k
p
X h LS
b b
p
  
 


 
  
  
. 
Substituting (13) into (11) yields the representative consumer‟s indirect utility function: 
(14) 1 1V h h LS LSh LS Y
b b b
              
    
. 
Eq. (14) is a special case of (7), in which 1 1A h h LS LSh LS
b b b
             
    
 and 1B  .  
The conditions that 0h   and 0h   are sufficient for 0
j
j
X
p



, because: 
(15) 
2 1 1
2
1
exp( ) ( ) exp( ) ( )exp( )
exp( )
j j k k j j
k jj
M
j
k k
k
p bh Q p h Q p
X
p
b p
      
 
 


 
      
  
  
 
 


. 
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2.2 Elasticities 
From the market demand function (5), we obtain the following proposition regarding elasticities. 
Proposition 2 
The own-price elasticity from the logit-type market demand function for good j  is: 
(16) (1 )
j j
j j j
j j
X p
s p
p X
 

  

, 
where 
j
j
j
pC
p C




 is the elasticity of the market demand for a group of goods, C , with respect to 
the price of good j , jp .  The cross-price elasticity of demand for good j  is: 
(17) 
j j
j j j
j j
X p
s p
p X
 

  


 

, 
where 1,...,j M   and j j  . 
Proof 
These results follow straightforwardly from the market demand function, (5). 
Both elasticities differ from those in classical discrete choice models by adding the price 
elasticity of market demand for the group.  The cross-price elasticities are the same among all goods, 
and the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) holds, even if the market demand 
for a group is endogenous. 
With regard to the own-price elasticity, we cannot determine whether demand is more elastic if 
the market demand for a group is exogenous or endogenous.  For example, suppose that the market 
demand for a group is estimated by assuming that it is exogenously fixed and includes the three 
choices „select A‟, „select B‟, or „select neither‟.  The choice probability is one-third for each 
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alternative.  For the sake of simplicity, assume that 1Ap  .  The own-price elasticity of AX  is 
2
3
A A
A A
X p
p X

 

 from (16).  When the market demand for a group is endogenous, the true own-price 
elasticity of AX  is 
1
2
A A
A
A A
X p
p X


 

 from 
1
13
1 1 2
3 3
A Bs s  

.  
1
2
A   may be larger or smaller 
than 
2
3
 , depending on the value of A . 
With regard to the cross-price elasticity, we derive a clearer result; ignoring the price elasticity 
of market demand for a group may change the sign of the cross-price elasticity of each good.  If the 
market demand for a group is exogenously fixed, the cross-price elasticity of good j  is positive 
because 0j js p    .  By contrast, if market demand is endogenous, the cross-price elasticity of good 
j  may be negative because 0j   .  In reality, when the market demand for a group is endogenous, 
an increase in the price of a particular good has the twin effects of increasing demand for substitutes 
and decreasing the market demand for the group.  Fixing the market demand for a group eliminates 
the latter effect, and, therefore, an increase in the price of a particular good cannot lower demand for 
other goods. 
2.3 Welfare analysis 
In this section, we focus on calculating equivalent variation.  The same procedure applies for 
calculating compensating variation if WOV  and WOv  are substituted for WV  and Wv , respectively, in 
the following analysis.  Henceforth, the superscripts WO  and W  denote without and with a policy, 
respectively.  The results are summarized in Proposition 3. 
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Proposition 3 
Equivalent variation can be calculated from the consumer‟s demand for a good, the market 
demand for a good, each consumer‟s demand for a group of goods, or the market demand for a group 
of goods, as follows: 
(18) 
1
1
1
1
( , ,..., , )
( , )
( , ,..., , )
( , ) ,
WO
j
W
j
WO
j
W
j
WO
W
WO
W
N p
i iW
j M j
p
i
p
W
j j
p
NLS
i iW
M
LS
i
LS
W
LS
EV h LS p p v dp
H LS V dp
c LS p p v dLS
C LS V dLS










 
where 1( , ,..., , )
i i
j Mh LS p p v  is consumer i ‟s Hicksian demand function for good j , ( , )jH LS V  is the 
Hicksian market demand function for good j , 1( , ,..., , )
i i
Mc LS p p v  is consumer i ‟s Hicksian 
demand function for a group of goods, and ( , )C LS V  is the Hicksian market demand function for a 
group of goods. 
Proof 
See Appendix 2. 
The transformation from the first to the second line and from the third to the fourth line in (18) 
follows from the fact that, under the Gorman restriction, each consumer‟s indirect utility function can 
be aggregated to the indirect utility function of the representative consumer.  The distinctive feature 
of the logit model, which is also true of GEV models (as shown later), is that the equivalent variation 
can be calculated not only from the demand and price of good j  but also from the demand for a 
group of goods, by using the log-sum term.  In particular, if the market demand of a group is equal to 
the number of consumers, N , the result in (18) reduces to the well-known method developed by 
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Small and Rosen (1981), under which equivalent variation is calculated from the change in the log-
sum term multiplied by the number of consumers. 
2.4 Multiple groups 
We have so far assumed that goods 1,...,M  belong to the same group.  In reality, goods can be 
classified into multiple groups, such as food and clothes.  Our analysis can be readily extended to the 
case in which goods are classified into multiple groups and a consumer can choose multiple goods 
from multiple groups. 
Suppose that the goods are classified into G  groups and that good j  belongs to group g  
( 1,...,g G ), without loss of generality.  Suppose that the market demand function for good j , 
which belongs to group g , is consistent with the logit model, as follows: 
(19) 1 1( ,..., , ) ( ,..., , )j M g M gjX p p Y C p p Y s , 
where 
exp( ( ), )
exp( ( ), )
j j
gj
k k
k g
u p Y
s
u p Y



 is the choice probability for good j  within group g  and 
1( ,..., , )g MC p p Y  is the market demand for group g . 
Propositions 1 to 3 require only minor modification when there are multiple groups.  To avoid 
repetition, our analysis of multiple groups is relegated to Appendix 3, in which we derive 
Propositions 1' to 3', which are modified versions of Propositions 1 to 3. 
Because the relationship between groups is unrestricted, we can represent various relationships 
between groups in our model.  This is a clear advantage over a typical discrete choice model that 
incorporates the grouping of goods, such as the nested logit model, which limits the relationship 
between groups to the logit. 
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As an example, suppose that there are two groups ( 1,2l  ) and that preferences between them 
are represented by the CES utility function.  Suppose further that the preference within each group is 
of the logit type.  The indirect utility function of the representative consumer is: 
(20) 
1
2 1
1
1
l
l
V Y LS





 
  
 
 , 
where 
1
ln exp( )g k g k
k g
LS p 
 
    and   is the elasticity of substitution between the two groups.  
The demand for group g , given by gC , has the CES form as follows: 
(21) 
2
1
1
g
g
l
l
YLS
C
LS







. 
The market demand function for good j  in group g  is: 
(22) 
2
1
1
exp( )
exp( )
g j g j
j
k g k
l k g
l
YLS p
X
p
LS


 
 







. 
This has the form of the CES-type market demand function for a group multiplied by the logit-
type choice probability. 
3. The GEV Model 
The analysis of Section 2 can be extended to the GEV model, which is a general form of logit 
model.  From McFadden (1978, Theorem 1), the GEV model can be described by using the function 
1( , , )MF z z , where exp( ( , ))j j jz u p Y . 
(GEV–1) 1( , , )MF z z  is nonnegative. 
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(GEV–2) 
1( , , )MF z z  is homogenous of degree n .
8
 
(GEV–3) 
1lim ( , , )jz MF z z  . 
(GEV–4) The  th partial derivative of 1( , , )MF z z  with respect to any combination of distinct 
jz s is nonnegative if   is odd and nonpositive if   is even.  That is, 0
j
F
z



 for all j , 
2
0
j j
F
z z 


 
 
for all 1,...,j M   and j j  , 
3
0
j j j
H
z z z 


  
 for any distinct j , j , and j  ( 1,...,j M  ), and so 
on for higher-order derivatives. 
Under assumptions (GEV–1) to (GEV–4), from McFadden (1978, Theorem 1), the choice 
probability for good j  is: 
(23) 
j
j
GEVj
F
z
z
s
nF


 . 
Extending the analysis of Section 2 to the GEV model is straightforward.  The points to note are 
as follows. 
i) Proposition 1 holds if the log-sum term and the choice probability for good j  are modified from 
(8) and (10) to: 
(24) 1 1
1
ln (exp( ), ,exp( ))GEV M MLS F p p
n
   

    , 
                                                 
8
 McFadden (1978, Theorem 1) assumed homogeneity of degree one.  Ben-Akiba and Francois (1983) demonstrate 
that H  can be homogeneous of degree n .  See also Ben-Akiba and Lerman (1985, p. 126). 
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(25) 
exp( )j j
j GEV
GEVj
j
F
p
z LS
s
nF p
 


 
 

. 
ii) The essence of Proposition 2 holds: for the GEV model, the elasticities of market demand are 
added to the standard own-price and cross-price elasticities when the market demand for a group is 
endogenous.  The own-price elasticity of market demand for good j , GEVjX , is: 
(26) (1 )
GEVj j
j GEVj j jj
j GEVj
X p
ns p
p X
  

   

, 
where 
j j
jj
j
j
F
z p
p F
z

 
   
  
   
 is the elasticity of 
j
F
z


 with respect to the price of good j , jp .  The 
cross-price elasticity is: 
(27) 
GEVj j
j j j jj
j GEVj
X p
ns p
p X
  

   


  

. 
iii) With regard to welfare analysis, Proposition 3 holds, although the log-sum term is modified 
from (8) to (24). 
iv) The extension to the case of multiple groups is analogous to that for the logit model. 
4. The Mixed Logit Model 
From now on, we focus on „mixed‟ versions of the logit and GEV models.  We consider the 
mixed logit model in this section and consider the mixed GEV model in the next section. 
Suppose that each consumer derives a different level of utility from consuming a unit of good j .  
The differences in utility among consumers are unobservable and are treated probabilistically; we 
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assume that each consumer has his or her own parameter, i , whose probability density function is 
( )if  . 
From Train (2003), the mixed logit model has the following choice probability: 
(28) ( ) ( ) ,
i
i i i i
ML j MLjs s f d

     
where: 
(29) 
1
exp( ( , , ))
( )
exp( ( , , ))
i i i
j ji i
MLj M
i i i
k k
k
u p y
s
u p y






. 
For now, suppose that all goods belong to the same group.  Our analysis is easily extended to the 
case in which goods are classified into multiple groups: see Appendix 6. 
Because indirect utility functions must satisfy Gorman‟s (1961) restriction, given that consumer 
i ‟s parameter is i , the conditional indirect utility function of consumer i  is: 
(30) 1 1 1( ,..., , , ) ( ,..., , ) ( ,..., )
ci i i i i i
M M Mv p p y A p p B p p y   , 
Because i  follows the probability density function ( )if  , the unconditional indirect utility 
function of consumer i  is: 
(31)  1 1( ) ( ,..., , ) ( ,..., ) ( )
i i
i ci i i i i i i i
M Mv v f d A p p B p p y f d
 
        . 
The unconditional indirect utility function of the representative consumer is: 
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(32) 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
( ,..., , ) ( ,..., ) ( )
( ,..., , ) ( ) ( ,..., )
i
i
N N
i i i i i
M M
i i
N
i i i i
M M
i
V v A p p B p p y f d
A p p f d B p p Y


  
  
 

  
 
 

. 
4.1 A utility maximization problem that yields mixed-logit-type demand functions 
When a change in consumer i ‟s demand is taken into account, the market demand function for 
good j  that is consistent with the mixed logit model is: 
(33) 1
1 1
( ,..., , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i
N N
i i i i i i i i i i i
MLj ML M MLj MLj
i i
X c p p y s f d x f d
 
      
 
    , 
where MLjX  is the market demand for good j , 1( ,..., , , )
i i i
ML Mc p p y   is consumer i ‟s demand for a 
group of goods, and ( )i iMLjx   is consumer i ‟s demand for good j . 
We can now state the following proposition about the form of the indirect utility function of the 
representative consumer. 
Proposition 4 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the market demand function for good j  to have the 
form of (33) is that the indirect utility function of the representative consumer be: 
(34)  
1
( ( ), ) ( )
i
N
i i i i i i
ML
i
V A LS f d BY

   

  , 
where B  is a fixed constant and: 
(35) 
1
1
( ) ln exp( ( ) ( ) )
( )
M
i i i i i i
ML k ki i
k
LS p    
  
   . 
The market demand function for good j , (33), satisfies: 
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(36) 
( ) ( )
( ( ), ) 0
i ci
i i i i
i i i i ML ML
ML ML
A v
LS LS
c LS
B B
 
 
 
 
 
   , 
(37) 
1
exp( ( ) ( ) ) ( )
( )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
i i i i i i
j ji i ML
MLj M
i i i i j
k k
k
p LS
s
p
p
    

   

 
 


. 
Proof 
See Appendix 4. 
The major difference from the logit model is that the indirect utility function of the 
representative consumer is quasi-linear.  The reason is as follows.  In the mixed logit model, the log-
sum term, ( )i iMLLS  , differs among consumers.  From Gorman‟s (1961) restriction, the coefficient of 
income, 1( ,..., )MB p p , must be the same for all consumers.  This implies that the coefficient of 
income, 1( ,..., )MB p p , does not include the log-sum term, ( )
i i
MLLS  .  Moreover, one can obtain the 
market demand function for a group of goods and the choice probability for the mixed logit model 
only when the coefficient of income, 1( ,..., )MB p p , does not depend on the prices, jp .  Thus, 
1( ,..., )MB p p  is the fixed constant B , and the indirect utility function of the representative consumer 
is quasi-linear.  Hence, the market demand function for good j  is independent of income.  The 
mixed logit model, if it is formulated to be consistent with standard microeconomic utility 
maximization, can deal with differences in parameters among consumers and can thereby incorporate 
consumer differences in utility obtained from the consumption of goods.  However, the mixed logit 
model cannot deal with the income effect. 
4.2 Elasticities 
From the mixed logit-type market demand function, (33), we obtain the following proposition 
about elasticities. 
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Proposition 5 
The own-price elasticity of the market demand for good j  is: 
(38)  
1
( ( ), ) ( )
( ) (1 ( )) ( )
i
i i i i i iN
MLj j ML ML MLj i i i i i i
j MLj j
ij MLj MLj
X p c LS s
s p f d
p X X

  
     

   
   
   
 , 
where 
( ( ), )
( )
( ( ), )
i i i i
ji i ML ML
j i i i i
j ML ML
pc LS
p c LS
 
 
 



 is the price elasticity of consumer i ‟s group 
demand.  The cross-price elasticity is: 
(39)  
1
( ( ), ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i i i iN
MLj j ML ML MLj i i i i i i
j MLj j
ij MLj MLj
X p c LS s
s p f d
p X X

  
     

  

   
  
   
 . 
Proof 
The results follow straightforwardly from the market demand function, (33). 
If the parameter i  is a fixed constant, the results in (38) and (39) are consistent with the 
corresponding results for the logit model, given by (16) and (17), respectively.  Otherwise, the own-
price and cross-price elasticities are more flexible.  Thus, the mixed logit model can deal with more 
complex substitution and complementarity patterns.  In particular, the IIA property does not hold 
because the cross-price elasticities in (39) depend on 
( ( ), ) ( )i i i i i iML ML MLj
MLj
c LS s
X
  
, which differs among 
goods. 
4.3 Welfare analysis 
The indirect utility function of the representative consumer that yields the mixed logit model, 
(34), is quasi-linear.  Thus, the Hicksian and the Marshallian demand curves coincide, and equivalent 
variation, compensating variation, and the change in the consumer surplus also coincide.  We can 
state the following proposition about welfare measurement. 
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Proposition 6 
Equivalent variation can be calculated from consumer i ‟s demand for a good or from consumer 
i ‟s demand for a group of goods; that is: 
(40) 
1
( )
( )
1
( ( ), ) ( )
( ( ), ) ( ) ( ) .
iWO
j
iW
ji
iWO i
ML
iW i
MLi
N p
i i i i i i
MLj ML j
p
i
N LS
i i i i i i i i
ML ML ML
LS
i
EV x LS dp f d
c LS dLS f d




   
    


 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Proof 
See Appendix 5. 
In the mixed logit model, there are two ways of calculating equivalent variation.  The first 
method is to calculate equivalent variation for consumer i  by using his or her demand function for 
good j , and then sum over all consumers.  The second method is to calculate equivalent variation by 
using his or her demand function for a group of goods and the log-sum term, ( )i iMLLS  .  Note that 
equivalent variation cannot be calculated by using the market demand for good j  or the market 
demand for a group of goods.  This represents a difference from Proposition 3 for the logit model.  
The reason for this is that because consumer i ‟s demand depends on his or her own parameter, it 
cannot be summed without integrating over this parameter.  This result is not surprising given that 
the mixed logit model explicitly considers differences in parameters among consumers. 
As explained in Section 4.1, the mixed logit model cannot deal with the income effect.  By 
contrast, the logit model can deal with the income effect under the Gorman restriction.  Thus, welfare 
measurement based on the logit model, (18), is not generally a special case of that based on the 
mixed logit model, (40).  This is only the case for a quasi-linear indirect utility function.  In this case, 
if all consumers have the same parameter ( i  ), the first and second lines in (40) coincide with 
the first and third lines in (18). 
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5. The Mixed GEV Model 
McFadden and Train (2000) demonstrate that the mixed logit model can approximate any 
random utility model.  However, the mixed GEV model is probably more suitable because of its 
analytical properties (Bhat et al. 2007).  Therefore, in this section, we derive the properties of the 
mixed GEV model. 
The extension from the mixed logit model to the mixed GEV model is analogous to that from the 
logit model to the GEV model.  The following points should be noted. 
i) Proposition 4 holds if the log-sum term and the choice probability for good j  are modified from 
(35) and (37) to: 
(41) 1 1
1
( ) ln (exp( ( ) ( ) ), ,exp( ( ) ( ) ))
( )
i i i i i i i i i i
MGEV M Mi i
LS F p p
n
        
 
    , 
(42) 
exp( ( ) ( ) )
( )
( )
i i i i
j j i i
ji i MGEV
MGEVj i
j
F
p
z LS
s
nG p
   




 
 

. 
ii) The own-price and cross-price elasticities from the GEV model are mixed in the same way as are 
those from the mixed logit model.  The own-price elasticity of the market demand for good j , 
MGEVjX , is: 
(43) 
 
1
( ( ), ) ( )
( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ,
i
MGEVj j
j MGEVj
i i i i i iN
MGEV MGEV MGEVj i i i i i i i i
j MGEVj j jj
i MGEVj
X p
p X
c LS s
ns p f d
X

  
       



  
    
  

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where 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
i
i i
j ji i
jj
i
j
i i
j
F
z p
p F
z


 


 
   
  
   
 is the elasticity of 
( )
( )
i
i i
j
F
z




, where ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i ij j jz p      , 
with respect to the price of good j , jp .  The cross-price elasticity is: 
(44)  
 
1
( ( ), ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
i
MGEVj j
j MGEVj
i i i i i iN
MGEV MGEV MGEVj i i i i i i i i
j MGEVj j jj
i MGEVj
X p
p X
c LS s
ns p f d
X

  
       


   



  
   
  

 
iii) Welfare analysis is the same as in the mixed logit model if ( )i iMLLS   is replaced by 
( )i iMGEVLS   in (41). 
iv) The extension to the case of multiple groups is analogous to that for the mixed logit model. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we formulated a structure for utility maximization problems that are consistent 
with demand functions derived from the generalized extreme value (GEV) model and the associated 
mixed models.  We also clarified the characteristics of the form of the utility function, the elasticities, 
and the measurement of welfare.  The results of the paper demonstrate that GEV and mixed GEV 
models that incorporate endogenous demands for groups of goods; that is, those models without a 
controlled total, are consistently formulated as standard microeconomic utility maximization 
problems of a representative consumer.  Before concluding our analysis, we comment on three issues. 
First, to be consistent with our analysis, in the GEV and the mixed GEV models, the utility 
gained from consuming a good should not depend on income, in which case, the choice probability 
does not depend on income.  This result is a consequence of the Gorman restriction.  Unfortunately, 
the three elements of income nonlinearities, the existence of many consumers, and practical benefit 
 26 
estimation cannot be incorporated simultaneously in the current framework of microeconomics.  Our 
analysis can only be used for practical benefit estimation in the context of a many-consumer 
economy if the Gorman restriction is imposed, but this is incompatible with income nonlinearity.  
When the indirect utility function is nonlinear in income, practical benefit estimation is only possible 
in the case of a one-consumer economy.  When indirect utility functions are nonlinear in income in a 
many-consumer economy, although one can use a social welfare function, practical benefit 
estimation is almost impossible. 
Second, another restriction we derived is that the utility gained from consuming a good is linear 
in price.  Without this restriction, one cannot relate GEV and mixed GEV models that incorporate 
endogenous demand for groups of goods to a complete utility maximization problem for a 
representative consumer.  Empirically, it would be easy to construct a model in which utility is 
nonlinear in price.  However, our analysis cannot be applied if there is nonlinearity in price; in this 
case, one could resolve the situation by using a random utility maximization framework that 
incorporates an a priori controlled total, but this would be inconsistent with complete utility 
maximization. 
Third, Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995, 1999), and Nevo (2000, 2001) estimate a mixed logit 
model by using market data.  Although an advantage of this is that there is no need to collect 
individual data, the approach is not consistent with complete utility maximization because an a priori 
controlled total must be incorporated.  Hence, the estimated own-price and cross-price elasticities 
would be biased.  Although our formulation circumvents these problems, it is relatively costly to 
apply empirically because one requires data on individual consumers. 
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Appendix 1 Proof of Proposition 1 
Suppose that each consumer values good j  differently, ( , )i ij ju p y .  Define 

1( ,..., , )
i i
MLS p p y  
as: 
(A1) 
1
1
( ,..., , ) ln exp( ( , ))
M
i i i i
M k k
k
LS p p y u p y

   . 
By solving (A1) with respect to 1p  and then substituting the resulting expression into (1), we can 
rewrite (1) as: 
(A2)  1 2 1 2( ( , ,..., , ),..., ) ( ( , ,..., , ),..., )
i i i i i i i
M M M Mv A p LS p p y p B p LS p p y p y  . 
Because the Gorman restriction implies that 1 2( ( , ,..., , ),..., )
i i i
M MA p LS p p y p  is independent of 
iy  
and that 1 2( ( , ,..., , ),..., )
i i
M MB p LS p p y p  is independent of 
iy  and the same for all consumers, it 
follows that: 
(A3)  1 2 2( ( ,..., ), ,..., ) ( ,..., ) ,
i i i i
M M Mv A LS p p p p B p p y   
where: 
(A4)  1
1
( ,..., ) ln exp( ( ))
M
i i
M k k
k
LS p p u p

   . 
By applying Roy‟s Identity to (A3), the market demand function for good 1 is derived as: 
(A5) 
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
1
exp( ( ))
.
exp( ( ))
iiN N
i i
Mi
ii i
k k
k
u pA
X x u
LS u p 

 
    
 
 
 
 

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Because 
1 1( )
iu p  differs among consumers, for (A5) to be consistent with (5): 
(A6) 
1 1
1 1
1
1
exp( ( ))
exp( ( ))
ii N
i
Mi
ii
k k
k
u pA
X u
LS u p

 
    
 
 
 


, 
where 1 1( ,..., )
i
i
M i
A
C p p u
LS
 

 is constant and 1 11
1
1
exp( ( ))
exp( ( ))
iN
L M
ii
k k
k
u p
s
u p

 
 
 
 
 
 


. 
This implies that the market demand for a group of goods must be fixed; that is, the determination of 
market demand for a group of goods cannot be incorporated into a utility maximization problem.  
Thus, if the market demand for a group is endogenously determined and is consistent with the market 
demand function of the logit model, (5), all consumers place the same valuation on good j . 
We prove the necessary condition first.  Define  1( ,..., , )
i
MLS p p y  as: 
(A7)  1
1
( ,..., , ) ln exp( ( , ))
M
i i
M k k
k
LS p p y u p y

   . 
By solving (A7) with respect to 1p  and then substituting the resulting expression for 1p  into (2), we 
can rewrite (2) as: 
(A8) 
 
 
1 2 1 2
1
1 2 1 2
1
( ( , ,..., , ),..., ) ( ( , ,..., , ),..., )
( ( ,..., , ), ,..., ) ( ( ,..., , ), ,..., ) .
N
i i i
M M M M
i
N
i i i
M M M M
i
V A p LS p p y p B p LS p p y p Y
A LS p p y p p B LS p p y p p Y


 
 


 
To satisfy the condition that consumer i ‟s indirect utility function have the Gorman form, 

1 2( ( ,..., , ), ,..., )
i i
M MA LS p p y p p  must be independent of 
iy  and  1 2( ( ,..., , ), ,..., )
i
M MB LS p p y p p  must 
be independent of iy  and the same for all consumers.  Thus: 
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(A9)  
1 2 1 2
1
( ( ,..., ), ,..., ) ( ( ,..., ), ,..., ) ,
N
i
M M M M
i
V A LS p p p p B LS p p p p Y

   
where: 
(A10) 
1
1
( ,..., ) ln exp( ( ))
M
M k k
k
LS p p u p

   . 
Eq. (A10) implies that the utility obtained from consuming a unit of good j  is independent of 
income.  Applying Roy‟s Identity to (A9) yields the following market demand function for good 1: 
(A11) 
  1 1
1 1 1
1 1
1
( )
exp( ( ))
( ,..., , )
exp( ( ))
iN
i
M M
k k
k
A B
Y u p
u pLS LS
X p p Y
B
u p


    
  


. 
Comparing (5) and (A11) when 1j   reveals: 
(A12) 
  1 1
1
1
( )
( ,..., , )
iN
i
M
A B
Y u p
LS LS
C p p Y
B

    
  

. 
In the same way, the market demand function for good m  ( 2,...,m M ) is derived as: 
(A13) 
 
1 1
1
1
exp( ( ))
( )
exp( ( ))
( ,..., , )
i iN N
m m
m m M
i i m m
k k
k
m M
u pA B A B
Y u p Y
p pLS LS
u p
X p p Y
B
 

         
     

 

. 
Comparing (5) and (A13) when j m  reveals: 
(A14) 
 
1
1
( )
( ,..., , )
iN
m m
i
M
A B
Y u p
LS LS
C p p Y
B

    
  

, 
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(A15) 
1
0
iN
i m m
A B
Y
p p
 
 
 
 . 
Because (A15) holds for any Y , we obtain: 
(A16) 
1
0
iN
i m m
A B
p p
 
 
 
 . 
The above analysis applies when solving (A7) with respect to any jp  and then substituting the 
resulting expression into (2).  Thus, for all cases, we can write the indirect utility function of the 
representative consumer as: 
(A17)  
1
1
( , ,..., ) ( )
N
i
M
i
V A LS p p B LS Y

  , 
where, from (A16): 
(A18) 

1
1
( , ,..., )
0
N
i
M
i
j
A LS p p
p

 
  
  


 for any jp . 
Thus, we can rewrite (A17) as: 
(A19)  ( ) ( )V A LS B LS Y  , 
where   1
1
( ) ( , ,..., )
N
i
M
i
A LS A LS p p

 . 
Because 1( ,..., , )MC p p Y  is the same for any good j , from (A12) and (A14), we obtain: 
(A20) 1 1( ) ... ( )M Mu p u p
   . 
This implies that ( )j ju p  is linear in jp .  Thus, we can express ( )j ju p  as: 
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(A21) ( )j j j ju p p   . 
The choice probability, (10), follows from (6) and (A21).  From (A21),  1( ,..., )MLS p p  can be written 
as: 
(A22) 
1
1
( ,..., ) ln exp( )
M
M k k
k
LS p p p 

   . 
Eq. (8) is derived by defining: 
(A23)  1
1
( ,..., )MLS LS p p

 . 
Substituting (A23) into (A19) yields (7). 
Because the indirect utility function of the representative consumer is decreasing in jp , we 
obtain: 
(A24) 
1
exp( )
0
exp( )
j j
M
j j
k k
k
pV V LS V
p LS p LS
p
 
 

   
  
   

. 
This implies: 
(A25) 
1
0
iN
i
V A B
Y
LS LS LS
  
  
  
 . 
From (A14), (A23), (A25), and 1 1( ) ... ( ) 0M Mu p u p       , the market demand for a group of 
goods, (9), is: 
(A26) 
 
1 1
( )
( , ) 0
i iN N
m m
i i
A B A B
Y u p Y
LS LSLS LS
C LS Y
B B
 
           
       
 
. 
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By using Roy‟s Identity, proving sufficiency is straightforward.  Applying Roy‟s Identity to (7) 
yields: 
(A27) 
1
1
exp( )
exp( )
iN
ij j j
j M
k k
k
V A B
Y
p pLS LS
X
V B
p
Y
 
 


   
       





, 
where: 
(A28) 
1
( , )
iN
i
A B
Y
LS LS
C LS Y
B

  
  
  

. 
From (A25), this expression is positive.  In addition: 
(A29) 
1
exp( )
exp( )
j j
j M
j
k k
k
p LS
s
p
p
 
 

 
 


. 
Eq. (5) is derived from (A27) to (A29). 
Appendix 2 Proof of Proposition 3 
From (7), the expenditure functions of consumer i  and the representative consumer are, 
respectively: 
(A30) 11
( , ,..., )
( , ,..., , )
( )
i i
i M
M
v A LS p p
e LS p p v
B LS

 , 
(A31) 
1
1
( , ,..., )
( , )
( )
N
i
M
i
V A LS p p
E LS V
B LS




. 
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From (A30) and (A31), we obtain consumer i ‟s Hicksian demand function for good j  and the 
Hicksian market demand function for good j : 
(A32) 
 
1 2
( , ,..., , )
( ( ))
i i
i i
i
j j ji
j M
j
A LS A B LS
B v A
LS p p LS pe
h LS p p v
p B LS
     
            

, 
and: 
(A33) 
1 1
2
1 1
2
1
1
( , )
( ( ))
( ( ))
( , ,..., , ).
i iN N
i
i ij j j
j
j
iN N
i
i ij j
N
i
j M
i
A LS A B LS
B V A
LS p p LS pE
H LS V
p B LS
A LS B LS
B V A
LS p LS p
B LS
h LS p p v
 
 

       
                  

      
              

 
 

 
Denoting consumer i ‟s equivalent variation by iev , from (A30) to (A33), we can derive: 
(A34) 
1
1
1
1
1
1
( , ,..., , )
( , ,..., , )
( , ) .
WO
j
W
j
WO
j
W
j
WO
m
W
m
WO
j
W
j
N
i
i
iN p
j
p
i j
N p
i iw
j M j
p
i
Np
i iw
j M j
p
i
p
W
j j
p
EV ev
e
dp
p
h LS p p v dp
h LS p p v dp
H LS V dp





 
    








 
Substituting (A33) into (A34) and rearranging yields: 
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(A35) 
 
1 1
2
2
1
( , )
( ( , ))
( ( ))
WO
j
W
j
WO
j
W
j
WO
j
W
j
p
W
j j
p
iN N
i
p i ij j
j
p
i
i i
Np j j
j
p
i
i
EV H LS V dp
A LS B LS
B V A
LS p LS p
dp
B LS w
A LS B LS
B v A
LS p LS p
dp
B LS
A
B
LS
 


      
              
     
            
 
 
 
 
 
 

 


 
2
1
1
1
( ( ))
( , ,..., , )
( , ) ,
WO
W
WO
W
WO
W
i i
NLS
LS
i
NLS
i iW
M
LS
i
LS
W
LS
B
v A
LS
dLS
B LS
c LS p p v dLS
C LS V dLS


 
  
 
 
 
 





 
where: 
(A36) 
 
1 2
( , ,..., , )
( ( ))
i
i i
i iW
M
A B
B v A
LS LS
c LS p p v
B LS
  
   
   , 
(A37) 
1 1
2
( , )
( ( ))
iN N
i
i iW
A B
B V A
LS LS
C LS V
B LS
 
   
        
 
. 
Appendix 3 Analysis for Multiple Groups 
Taking into account the classification into multiple groups, Propositions 1 to 3 are modified as 
follows. 
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Proposition 1' 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the market demand function for good j  to have the 
form of (19) is that the indirect utility function of the representative consumer be: 
(A38) 1 1( ,..., ) ( ,..., )G GV A LS LS B LS LS Y  , 
where 
1 1
1
( ,..., , ,..., )
N
i
G M
i
A A LS LS p p

  and: 
(A39) 
1
ln exp( )g k g k
k gg
LS p 
 
   . 
The market demand function for good j , (19), satisfies: 
(A40) 
1
1( ,..., , ) 0
iN
i g g g
g G
A B V
Y
LS LS LS
C LS LS Y
B B

   
         

, 
(A41) 
exp( )
exp( )
j g j g
gj
k g k j
k g
p LS
s
p p
 
 

 
 
 
. 
Proposition 2' 
The own-price elasticity of the market demand for good j , jX , is: 
(A42) (1 )
j j
gj g gj j
j j
X p
s p
p X
 

  

, 
where 
g j
gj
j g
C p
p C




 is the elasticity of the market demand for group g , gC , with respect to the price 
of good j , jp .  The cross-price elasticity is: 
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(A43) 
j j
gj g gj j
j j
X p
s p
p X
 

  


 

, where 
g j
gj
j g
C p
p C







, 
when both goods j  and j  belong to the same group.  When these goods belong to different groups, 
the corresponding cross-price elasticity is: 
(A44) 
j j
gj
j j
X p
p X







. 
Proposition 3' 
Equivalent variation can be calculated from the consumer‟s demand for a good, the market 
demand for a good, the consumer‟s demand for a group of goods, or the market demand for a group 
of goods, as follows: 
(A45)  
1 1
1
1
1 1
1
1
( ,..., , ,..., , )
( ,..., , )
( ,..., , ,..., , )
( ,..., , ) .
WO
j
W
j
WO
j
W
j
WO
g
W
g
WO
g
W
g
N p
i iW
j G M j
p
i
p
iW
j G j
p
NLS
i iW
g G M g
LS
i
LS
iW
g G g
LS
EV h LS LS p p v dp
H LS LS V dp
c LS LS p p v dLS
C LS LS V dLS










 
where 1 1( ,..., , ,..., , )
i iW
g G Mc LS LS p p v  is consumer i ‟s Hicksian demand for group g , and 
1( ,..., , )
iW
g GC LS LS V  is the Hicksian market demand for group g. 
The derivation of the above results is a straightforward extension of the analysis of Sections 2.1 
to 2.3.  A different result is that goods j  and j  may belong to different groups, in which case, 
(A44) holds: the cross-price elasticity depends only on the elasticity of the market demand for group 
g  with respect to the price of good j , gj  . 
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Appendix 4 Proof of Proposition 4 
We prove the necessary condition first.  Define i
MLLS  as: 
(A46) 
1
1
( ,..., , , ) ln exp( ( , , ))
M
i i i i i i
ML M k k
k
LS p p y u p y 

   . 
Solving (A46) with respect to 1p  and then substituting this expression for 1p  into 1( ,..., , )
i i
MA p p   
and 1( ,..., )MB p p  in (31) yields: 
(A47)
 
  
  
1 2 2 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ( , ,..., , ), ,..., , ) ( ( , ,..., , ), ,..., ) ( )
( ( ,..., , , ), ,..., , ) ( ( ,..., , , ), ,..., ) ( ) .
i
i
i i i i i i i i i i
ML M M ML M M
i i i i i i i i i i i
ML M M ML M M
v A p LS p p y p p B p LS p p y p p y f d
A LS p p y p p B LS p p y p p y f d


  
    
 
 


 
To satisfy the condition that consumer i ‟s indirect utility function have the Gorman form, 

1 2( ( ,..., , , ), ,..., , )
i i i i i
ML M MA LS p p y p p   must be independent of 
iy  and 

1 2( ( ,..., , , ), ,..., )
i i i
ML M MB LS p p y p p  must be independent of 
iy  and the same for all consumers.  
Thus, consumer i ‟s unconditional indirect utility function is: 
(A48)  1 2 2( ( ,..., , ), ,..., , ) ( ,..., , ) ( )
i
i i i i i i i i i
ML M M Mv A LS p p p p B p p y f d

      , 
where: 
(A49)  1
1
( ,..., , ) ln exp( ( , ))
M
i i i i
ML M k k
k
LS p p u p 

   . 
Applying Roy‟s Identity to (A48) yields consumer i ‟s demand function for good 1: 
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(A50) 
 1 1
1 1
1 1
2
1
( )
exp( ( ))
( ,..., ) ( )
( ,..., )
exp( ( ))i
i
i i
i i
i i iML
ML M M
iM
k k
k
A
u p
LS u p
x p p f d
B p p
u p
 

       
  
     


. 
Summing (A50) across consumers yields the market demand function for good 1: 
(A51) 
 1 1
1 1
1
1 2
1
( )
exp( ( ))
( )
( ,..., )
exp( ( ))i
i
i i
i iN
i iML
ML M
ii M
k k
k
A
u p
LS u p
X f d
B p p
u p
 


       
  
     


. 
Comparing (33) and (A51) when 1j   reveals: 
(A52) 
 1 1
1
2
( )
( ,..., , )
( ,..., )
i
i i
i
i i ML
M
M
A
u p
LS
c p p
B p p

 

 . 
Analogously, the market demand function for good m  ( 2,...,m M ) is: 
(A53) 

1
1 2
exp( ( ))
( )
exp( ( ))
( )
( ,..., )i
ii i
i i im m
m m Mi
i m mML
k kN
k i i
MLm
i M
u pA A B
u p y
p pLS u p
X f d
B p p

 

  
           
     
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 

 . 
Comparing (35) and (A53) when j m  reveals: 
(A54) 

1
2
( )
( ,..., , )
( ,..., )
i
i i
m mi
i i ML
M
M
A
u p
LS
c p p
B p p

 

 , 
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(A55) 0
i
i
m m
A B
y
p p
 
 
 
. 
Because (A55) holds for any iy , we obtain: 
(A56) 0
i
m m
A B
p p
 
 
 
. 
The above analysis applies when solving (A46) with respect to any jp  and then substituting the 
resulting expression into (33).  Thus, from (A56), we know that consumer i ‟s conditional indirect 
utility function is independent of jp , as follows: 
(A57)  1( ( ,..., , ), ) ( )
i
i i i i i i i i
ML Mv A LS p p By f d

     , 
where B  is constant.  The indirect utility function of the representative consumer is: 
(A58)  1
1
( ( ,..., , ), ) ( )
i
N
i i i i i i
ML M
i
V A LS p p f d BY

   

  . 
Because 1( ,..., , )
i i
Mc p p   is the same for all j , from (A52) and (A54) we obtain: 
(A59) 1 1( ) ... ( )
i i
M Mu p u p
   . 
This expression indicates that ( )ij ju p  is linear in jp .  Thus, we can express ( )
i
j ju p  as: 
(A60) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i
j j j ju p p     . 
The choice probability, (37), follows from (29) and (A60).  Given (A60),  1( ,..., , )
i i
ML MLS p p   can be 
written as: 
 40 
(A61) 
1
1
( ,..., , ) ln exp( ( ) ( ) )
M
i i i i i i
ML M k k
k
LS p p p    

   . 
Eq. (35) is derived by defining: 
(A62)  1
1
( ) ( ,..., , )
( )
i i i i
ML ML Mi i
LS LS p p 
 
 . 
Substituting (A62) into (A58) yields (34). 
Because consumer i ‟s conditional indirect utility function is decreasing in jp , we obtain: 
(A63) 
1
exp( ( ) ( ) )( )
0
( ) ( )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
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This implies: 
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. 
Given (A54), (A62), (A64), and 1 1( ) ... ( ) ( )
i i i i
M Mu p u p       , consumer i ‟s demand for a group 
of goods, (36), is: 
(A65) 
 ( ) ( )
( ( ), ) 0
i i
i i
m mi i i
i i i i ML ML
ML
A Au p
LS LS
c LS
B B

 
  
 
   . 
Sufficiency is straightforward to prove by using Roy‟s Identity.  Applying Roy‟s Identity to (34) 
and rearranging yields: 
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where: 
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Eq. (67) is positive from (A64).  From (A66) to (A68), we derive (33). 
Appendix 5 Proof of Proposition 6 
From (30), consumer i ‟s conditional expenditure function is: 
(A69) 
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From (A69), we obtain consumer i ‟s conditional Hicksian demand function for good j  as follows: 
(A70) 
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. 
Because the Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions are the same when the indirect utility 
function is quasi-linear, from (36), (A69), and (A70), we obtain: 
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Appendix 6 Multiple Groups in the Case of the Mixed Logit Model 
Because the analysis of multiple groups in the mixed logit model is similar to that in the logit 
model described in Appendix 3, in this appendix, we simply state results. 
When there are multiple groups, the market demand function that is consistent with the mixed 
logit model is: 
(A72) 
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where ( )i iMLgc   is consumer i ‟s demand for group g  and ( )
i i
MLgjs   is consumer i ‟s logit-type choice 
probability for group g , which is: 
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. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the market demand function for good j  to have the 
form of (A72) is that the indirect utility function of the representative consumer be given by: 
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which satisfies: 
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The market demand function for good j , (A72), satisfies: 
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The own-price elasticity of the market demand for good j  is: 
(A78)
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 is the elasticity 
of consumer i ‟s demand for group g  with respect to the price of good j , jp .  When goods j  and 
j  belong to the same group, the cross-price elasticity is: 
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Otherwise, the cross-price elasticity is: 
(A80) 
1
1
( ( ),..., ( ), ) ( )
( ) ( )
i
i i i i i i i iN
MLj j MLg ML MLG MLgj i i i i
gj
ij MLj MLjw
X p c LS LS s
f d
p X X
   
   



   
  
   
 . 
Equivalent variation can be calculated from consumer i ‟s demand for good j  or from consumer 
i ‟s demand for group g ; that is: 
(A81) 
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